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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
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**United States Senate**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 11, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

History shows that Summit meetings with the Soviet Union have dangers as well as potential benefits. One danger is that America may fail to confront the Soviets on certain issues, revealing a lack of American political will and resolve. By our own reticence we may convince Soviet leaders and the world that we are afraid to challenge their dangerous actions. This in turn is dangerous for deterrence and world peace, because American political will is the essence of deterrence.

As you know, nine Senators wrote to you before the Geneva Summit asking that you discuss the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT Violations with Gorbachev. At the U.N. in late October, you promised to do so. Accordingly, we were extremely surprised to read reports about the Summit stating that the State Department prevented all Summit discussions of the Soviet SALT Violations.

By not even raising the specific violations in Geneva, we have encouraged the Soviets not to make any attempt to reverse them. Our failure to confront the Soviets on the violations will be interpreted by Gorbachev as U.S. appeasement. If we are so frightened of these Soviet violations that we do not even mention them at the highest level, then in effect we condone them by our silence, which betokens cowardice. Dictators readily understand appeasement and cowardice, and history shows that when appeased they continue their provocative behavior.

Our best chance to challenge the Soviets to reverse their violations has thus gone completely unused, and worse, our failure now signals U.S. weakness and tolerance of the dangerous, ever broadening pattern of Soviet SALT Break Out violations. U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT I and SALT II in the face of manifold confirmed Soviet SALT Break Out violations from both has gone beyond appeasement and has become abject U.S. unilateral disarmament.

Mr. President, Gorbachev threatened at the Summit that "all restraints will be blown to the winds," and, as confirmed by the Soviet SALT Break Out Violations themselves, this Gorbachev threat constitutes a Soviet admission of their violations.

We therefore request that your November 15, 1985 Response to Soviet Violations Paper be made public as soon as possible, and that you report urgently on the 8 new Soviet SALT violations which appeared on the eve of the Summit. We hope that you will now finally propose proportionate

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responses to the Soviet SALT Break Out violations, whose threatening danger to world peace was accentuated by our failure to confront the Soviets over them at the Summit. We will strongly support you.

Very Respectfully,

*James Helms*  
*John F. Bunker*  
*James A. McClure*

Annex: Failure to Raise Soviet SALT Violations At Summit

Copies to:

Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, JCS  
Director, CIA  
Director, ACDA

Annex: Failure to Raise Soviet SALT Violations At Summit

History shows that Summit meetings with the Soviet Union have dangers as well as potential benefits. One danger is that America may fail to confront the Soviets on certain issues, revealing a lack of American political will and resolve. By our own reticence we may convince Soviet leaders and the world that we are afraid to challenge their dangerous actions. This in turn is dangerous for deterrence and world peace, because American political will is the essence of deterrence.

Pledge On Summit Discussion of Soviet SALT Violations

As you know, Mr. President, clearly the most serious issue in U.S.-Soviet relations is the continuously expanding pattern of Soviet SALT violations. The Soviets have long ago Broken Out of the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, thereby dangerously jeopardizing world peace. There are now 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet violations of arms control accords, with many more--over 22--awaiting Presidential confirmation.

On September 9, 1985, 9 Republican Senators wrote to you urging you to discuss in detail each of the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT violations with Gorbachev in Geneva. In response, we were reassured by your pledge at the United Nations on October 24, 1985:

"We feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the provisions in all these agreements."

We interpreted this pledge to mean that the Soviets would be confronted in detail with each of the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT violations at the Summit. On October 29, 1985, three of us therefore thanked you for promising in your U.N. speech to confront Gorbachev. Indeed, we also stated that there were five dangerous new Soviet SALT violations detected on the very eve of the Summit, which made the necessity of confronting Soviet SALT violations all the more serious and urgent. Even after our letter, three more serious Soviet SALT violations were reported. Defense Secretary Weinberger even promised on October 31, 1985, in an open Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, to confirm these new violations publicly before the Summit. The State Department reportedly prevented him from doing so, however, thereby creating a State Department cover-up of new Soviet SALT violations detected on the very eve of the Summit.

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### State Department Appeasement

We are therefore utterly dismayed to read about the State Department cover-up at the Summit in the New York Times:

"The State Department official also said that although the Administration had repeatedly complained to Moscow about what it sees as Soviet violations of arms-control accords, this subject was not discussed in detail at the Summit meeting. He said that such compliance issues had been discussed when Secretary of State Shultz was in Moscow earlier in the month. Mr. Shultz told some columnists today that both sides in Geneva strongly reaffirmed the need for compliance, but that no specific violations were raised."

(November 23, 1985, emphasis added.)

Should we accept false, bland Soviet assurances about the "need" for compliance? No one seriously claims that the Soviets are trying to reverse their SALT Break Out violations and there is no evidence that they will. After all, the Soviet SALT Break Out violations contribute strongly to Soviet military superiority, and this superiority is the only basis for Soviet super-power status.

ACDA Director Adelman confirmed on December 9, 1985, that the United States did not raise the violations at the Summit. If we did not even raise the specific violations in Geneva, then, of course, we will encourage the Soviets not to make any attempt to even pretend to reverse them. Mr. President, failure to confront the Soviets in detail with each of the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT violations at the highest level, will certainly be interpreted by Gorbachev as U.S. appeasement. If we are so frightened of these Soviet violations that we do not even mention them at the highest level, then in effect we condone them by our silence, which betokens cowardice. Dictators readily understand appeasement and cowardice, and history shows that when appeased they continue their provocative behavior.

Our best chance to challenge the Soviets to reverse their violations has thus gone completely unused, and worse, our failure now signals U.S. weakness and tolerance of the dangerous, ever broadening pattern of Soviet SALT Break Out violations. U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT I and SALT II in the face of manifold confirmed Soviet SALT Break Out violations from both has gone beyond appeasement and has become abject U.S. unilateral disarmament.

Moreover, the State Department's continued Summit cover-up of Soviet SALT violations not only contradicts your U.N. pledge to us, but it also contradicts the State Department's own rhetoric. In a November 19, 1985 reply to a serious letter by Senator Symms of October 17, 1985 concerning

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the new Soviet SS-25 mobile ICBM deployment SALT II violation, the State Department piously stated:

"Any Soviet violation of an arms control agreement is a serious matter. As the President has said, strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less." (Emphasis added.)

But if Soviet SALT violations are so serious and fundamental, why did the State Department refuse to mention them at the Summit? Perhaps because the State Department has already accepted for almost a decade and a half much less than strict Soviet SALT compliance. In fact, the State Department has lead the cover-up of Soviet SALT violations.

#### Gorbachev Admission of Soviet SALT Break Out

It appears, Mr. President, that your Strategic Defense Initiative is more important to the Soviets than Soviet SALT Break Out violations are to you. Soviet leader Gorbachev stated that discussions on the issues of your SDI and arms control were "very, very sharp," and Gorbachev publicly threatened, "All restraints will be blown to the winds" unless you do not agree to abandon SDI. But, you have already stated that the Soviet SDI is 10 years ahead of the U.S. program.

In September, Gorbachev rattled Soviet sabres when he said that the international situation was "explosive," and in October he threatened "rough times" ahead for the U.S.

Gorbachev even boasted that the Soviet SDI "will be effective, though less expensive, and quicker to produce" than the U.S. SDI. These Gorbachev boasts confirm first that the Soviets believe they are indeed ahead of the U.S. in SDI.

But, even more ominously, Gorbachev's threats indicate that he believes all arms control restraints are in fact already "blown to the winds" and unleashed, as evidenced by the Soviet SALT Break Out violations themselves. This Gorbachev threat is thus a bold admission that the Soviets have Broken Out of SALT I and II, as their expanding SALT violations already have long confirmed. The Washington Times of December 9, 1985, quotes ACDA Director Adelman as saying that at the Summit, a Soviet official, in a rare moment of insight, said that "nations don't necessarily follow treaties when it's not in their national interest to do so." This is another Soviet admission.

#### Danger of Nuclear Blackmail

In the face of admitted and confirmed Soviet SALT Break Out violations

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and in the face of their boasted lead in SDI, we strongly urge you to propose U.S. proportionate responses. As you stated ominously on March 18, 1985:

"They [the Soviets] already outnumber us greatly in offensive weapons, and if they alone developed a defensive weapon before us, then they wouldn't have to worry about our deterrent--a retaliatory strike. Then they could issue an ultimatum to the world."

In sum, Mr. President, we are very much closer to Soviet nuclear blackmail than the appeasement oriented State Department will ever realize. The time for decisive American leadership to restore deterrence is overdue. We will support you all the way in responding to the Soviet Break Out threat.

We request that your Response to Soviet Violations Paper be made public as soon as possible, and that you report urgently on the 8 new Soviet SALT violations detected on the eve of the Summit.

#### Proportionate Responses

Mr. President, last January a White House official described the Soviet Krasnoyarsk Radar ABM Treaty violation as "a dagger pointed at the heart of arms control." We hope that you will now finally propose proportionate responses to the Soviet SALT Break Out violations, whose threatening danger to world peace was accentuated by our failure to confront the Soviets over them at the Summit.